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Pereyra (2019) discusses several problems arising
from the designation of a species’ native range, the
definition of which seems straightforward but, as
he demonstrates, has limitations. His interesting and
thought-provoking argument could point to conceptual
or technical challenges in ecological theory and help
remedy them. Unfortunately, Pereyra inadequately jumps
from particular issues in the definition of native range
to dismissal of the concept itself to questioning an entire
research field that uses it, invasion biology.
In essence, Pereyra’s essay is articulated along flawed
logical reasoning. The definition of nativeness is unclear;
therefore, the concept of nativeness is also unclear and
the concept of non-nativeness is unclear by symmetrical
reasoning. Consequently, a discipline based on non-
nativeness is open to question. We argue that each of
these 4 points and the logical links between them are
flawed. Moreover, Pereyra’s essay is based on errors in
reasoning, a misleading selection of examples, incorrect
citations, and sophisms and logic fallacies that are
unfortunate in the context of the increase in denial of
invasion biology (Russell & Blackburn 2017; Ricciardi &
Ryan 2018).
Imperfection of the Definition of Native Range
Perera’s starting point is that it is difficult to define a
species’ native range because the perfect spatial limit of
native range is not always known and ranges shift with
time. The former is true, just as the identity of some
species is unknown. There are 12,000 documented
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species of ants, out of an estimated 20,000 extant
species (Wilson & Hölldobler 1990). Not knowing the
approximately 8,000 undocumented species does not
mean the definition of ant species is problematic. Thus,
not knowing the boundaries of a species’ range does not
mean it does not have one. The evolution of such bound-
aries is no more problematic than the evolution of other
species’ traits and does not negate the existence of limits
to biogeographic distribution any more than evolution
does for other life history traits. Granted, the quantitative
outline of a range is not always known at any point in
time, but it still exists and has important implications.
Placing quantitative limits to species’ native ranges and
defining nativeness are 2 very different things; one can
be unclear without the other being unclear.
Clarity of the Definition of Native Range
The definition of native range is to some extent
contextual and subject to interpretation and therefore
likely to be different for different authors, but disagreeing
on the value of a parameter or trait because experts use
different rules to define it does not mean the concept is
invalid, does not exist, or is not useful.
Pereyra claims, “[t]he temporal dimension of native
range estimation is as unclear as the spatial dimension.”
The examples given are admittedly diverse (1492 for
America, 1770 for Australia…), but this reflects the
diversity of dates of first possible introductions by
humans, not a diversity of concepts. Contending this is a
problem is harmful because a potential difference in date
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of introduction among continents, or even in thresholds
among authors, would not mean the concept of native
range is problematic. Rabbits are not native to Australia,
regardless of the date of discovery of Australia. Moreover,
broadly accepted definitions of non-nativeness (e.g.,
Pyšek et al. 2004; Blackburn et al. 2011) do not entail
temporal limits. Often, threshold dates simply reflect
when knowledge of the first species inventories was
obtained and a conservative approach to identification
of species as native or non-native.
Pereyra uses the same faulty reasoning to invalidate
the idea of geographic barriers. He implies that because
it may be difficult to define what they are in all cases,
then defining a species as non-native because it crossed
a geographical barrier is incorrect. In general, when
a species is considered non-native because it crossed
a geographical barrier (e.g., an ocean for terrestrial
species, a catchment boundary for freshwater species),
it is because the geographical barrier in question is well
identified (Essl et al. 2018).
Pereyra’s wording provides the impression that
species’ native ranges are generally poorly known (e.g.,
“native range is often poorly characterized”), whereas
the opposite is true: They are known in most cases.
Denying this ignores the entirety of botanical and
zoological literature concerned with ranges (phyto-
geography and zoogeography). It is true that there are
many cases where range limits are insufficiently known,
but these are a minority. The wealth of information on
faunas and floras of the majority of the world, based
on work of local experts, provides robust and reliable
information for most species. Pereyra’s general wording
implies this is not the case, which is misleading. This
relates to Pereyra’s claim that invasion biology has not
provided a theoretical definition of native range. It has
not, indeed, because, as is common in science, this
field rests on centuries of research of another discipline,
biogeography (e.g., Danserau 1957).
In essence, the author implies that because the
concept does not apply clearly in some situations, the
entire concept is flawed. Yet, just because scientists
do not know how a particular species evolved, it does
not mean they reject evolution. Similarly, when it is
unclear whether an organism is a species or subspecies,
scientists do not reject the species concept. Pereyra
is arguing a logical approach: If one disproves the
particular, one disproves the universal. For example, if
one finds the law of gravity does not apply somewhere,
then one has disproved the entire law. However, biology
is not a science like physics, and there are few universal
laws that are true in all cases. In addition, the focus here
is a concept or definition, rather than a biological law, so
the logical approach is even more inappropriate.
Finally, the link between native range and native
species definitions is applied inappropriately. This
application is misleading because there are 2 senses
to the term define: quantitative and conceptual. So,
there is confusion between outlining a native range and
defining its concept; difficulties in the former do not
invalidate the existence of the latter. Second, difficulties
in defining a concept do not invalidate the existence or
usefulness of the concept. Scientists have problems with
the complex concept of biodiversity, but biodiversity
exists (Burch-Brown & Archer 2017).
Native Range versus Non-Native Range
Invasion biology is less concerned with the precise
identity of a species’ range than the certainty that the
species is non-native in a region and how species’ origin
may influence ecological interactions (Rejmánek & Sim-
berloff 2017). The exact native range of cats or some cos-
mopolitan weeds may be unknown because their precise
location of origin is unknown, but certainly some areas
(e.g., islands) to which they are non-native are known.
In any case, most of the comments in Pereyra (2019)
are about human fallacy (inability to define a native
species’ range), rather than the veracity of whether a
native (or non-native) species’ range exists (which it
does). That may mean that due to human limitations,
every non-native range cannot be perfectly defined (it is
of course much clearer on islands), but the concept is
still useful and important.
Although Pereyra elaborates on definitions of native-
ness, his understanding of how non-native species are
defined is inaccurate. He states “by definition, [a species
is] non-native when it is outside its current or historical
range.” This is untrue. They are only defined as such if
the reason they are found outside of their native range is
due to human agency (Pyšek et al. 2004; Blackburn et al.
2011). For example, New Zealand is still being naturally
colonized by species blown across from Australia, and
these species are treated as native. A recent case is
the Barn Owl (Tyto alba delicatula), which is native
in Australia and was recently determined to have an
established population in New Zealand, where it was
celebrated as its newest bird species in 2019. Similarly,
Pereyra (2019) claims “[i]f a species is found outside
its native range, it is usually considered non-native,
potentially invasive, and possibly troublesome,” but
this is rarely the case. In general, only a minority of
non-native species are seen as economic, environmental,
or social problems (Vilà et al. 2010).
From Questioning a Definition to Questioning a
Discipline
Even if there were problems with definitions of native-
ness and non-nativeness, it would not at all affect the
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importance of an entire discipline that uses this concept.
By cherry picking examples that are marginal and failing
to consider the typical state for the majority of species,
the demonstration is inadequately overgeneralizing. Yet,
even if the outline of the native range of every species
on Earth was undefined, it remains that invasion biology
would still be important for fundamental and applied
ecology.
Pereyra’s statement “the enigma here is that if species
are allowed to migrate to another more propitious area
and fend for itself, it will be considered not native
by invasion scientists” does invasion biology a great
disservice. Recently, invasion biologists have addressed
this very issue, and contrary to the negative view of
Pereyra, invasion biologists have proposed that naturally
migrating species be classified as “neonatives,” a distinct
type of native species (Essl et al. 2019).
Conclusion
The demonstration used by Pereyra is based on a
logical succession of 5 claims, none of which are
correct. It is based on misleading reasoning that ignores
contradictory evidence and creates the impression that
invasion biology is responsible for what he presents as
a failure. In line with previous, similar essays that deny
the importance of this discipline, we warn against such
faulty logic and the inappropriate conclusions it leads
to. Pereyra does not explicitly deny the validity of the
concept of non-native species, but his article could easily
be misinterpreted by those who seek to undermine the
significance of biological invasions as major agents of
global environmental change.
Invasion biology is an important discipline that has
led to tremendous progress in understanding ecological
functioning and is enabling scientists and biodiversity
managers to better conserve affected species and
ecosystems, as well as human societies (Genovesi
2005; Simberloff et al. 2011, 2013). Providing a critical
appraisal of theoretical concepts and ideas is an essential
endeavor in science, but one has to be particularly
careful that it is robustly anchored in facts and logic
in order to avoid contributing to the current trend in
scientific skepticism that damages the very basis of
fundamental and applied research.
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